The awful attack by a man with a knife on an inter city
train, that injured 11 people, is currently subject to investigation and one
man has been charged with serious offences.
In these circumstances it is not appropriate to comment in any detail on
the incident itself.
The investigation is being led by British Transport Police
(BTP) who have identified a linked offence on the Docklands Light Railway which
has also resulted in charges. Other
possible offences away from the railway network are being looked at by Cambridgeshire
Constabulary who have acknowledged that the overall lead for the investigation
sits with BTP.
The ‘lead force’ arrangement is not uncommon when a series
of possibly linked offences has taken place and span force areas. It is a sensible and operationally effective
way of approaching an investigation. BTP
are quite capable of performing this role and will have, I have no doubt,
allocated appropriate resources. They
have access to all the necessary specialisms that may be required. – including those
that reside within other forces. This
joined up approach is clearly in the public interest. It is fairly rare however for BTP to be the lead
force – an exception being – in England and Wales at least - the criminal
aspects of investigations into railway accidents. where the BTP lead principle is
obviously appropriate.
There are various agreements in place to facilitate the
interface between BTP and local police forces, including a Protocol (a copy of
the latest version of which appears not to be readily available). If this had been an attack that was deemed to
be a terrorist incident the investigation would have, nominally, been led by
the local force (according to the 2011 Protocol), but in practice by Counter
Terrorism Policing.
In the case of the Huntingdon outrage BTP can be the lead
force for the non railway cases if such a role is purely administrative. If BTP require constabulary powers then the
force can obtain them in various ways:
i.
If the possible crimes are seen to be “connected
to a railway or to anything occurring on or in relation to a railway.” (s31
Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003), Or
ii.
If BTP are formally giving mutual aid to
Cambridgeshire Constabulary, in which case the Chief Constable of
Cambridgeshire would be in charge of the officers ‘on aid’ (s24 Police Act
1996), Or
iii.
If Cambridgeshire Constabulary request the
assistance of BTP in relation to the non railway elements of the investigation
then this will suffice. Such a request
need not be in writing but is likely to be so recorded in this type of case. A request has to be made, BTP cannot assume responsibility
for the offences occurring outside the railway unless invited. If such a request has been made then the BTP
officers assisting would have all of the powers etc of an officer of the
Cambridgeshire force (s100 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001).
I have no doubt that this administrative issue will have
received the necessary attention, so why am I posting about it?
The issue in my view is:
why is this even necessary? Why
should police forces have to turn their mind, even briefly, to this sort of
arcane nonsense – especially in the middle of a major investigation? If Cambridgeshire were asking
Northamptonshire (or any other Home Office force) to take the overall lead the
question of jurisdiction would not arise.
It really is time for the jurisdiction and powers of BTP to be aligned
with other forces. This will be a
recurring theme on this blog I am sure.
In the meantime my best wishes are with the officers of both forces who
are investigating such dreadful crimes.
Philip Trendall
Nov 2025
Notes:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c05107088e1o
It is very hard to talk about the role of NHDPFs without
looking at the law. The legal background
to NHDPFs is complex and therefore I should remind anyone reading this is that
I am not a lawyer. I am certainly not qualified to offer any
advice on legal subjects. The views
expressed are my own.
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